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ANALYSIS OF SAEMAUL UNDONG: A KOREAN RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMME IN THE 1970s
Sooyoung Park*
I. INTRODUCTION
	 Globally,	more	than	1.2	billion	people	are	still	living	in	extreme	poverty	on	one	dollar	
a	day.1	Though	much	progress	has	been	made,	reducing	poverty	remains	a	colossal	task	
(World	Bank	2000,	p.	17).	The	case	of	the	Republic	of	Korea	in	this	circumstance	is	worth	
mentioning.	The	Republic	of	Korea	has	achieved	remarkable	socio-economic	development	
and	reduced	extreme	poverty,	which	had	plagued	the	country	for	a	very	long	time.	Until	now,	
it	is	the	only	country	in	the	world	that	has	overcome	the	three	common	hardships	observed	
in	most	developing	countries:	civil	wars	or	internal	conflicts;	a	colonial	legacy;	and	extreme	
poverty.	In	1953,	the	per	capita	gross	domestic	product	(GDP)	of	the	Republic	of	Korea	was	
$73,	and	this	increased	to	$21,695	in	2007.2	In	1965,	40.9	per	cent	of	the	population	suffered	
from	absolute	poverty,	but	the	poverty	rate	was	reduced	to	10.9	per	cent	by	2007.3
Saemaul Undong was a community-based integrated rural development programme 
of the Republic of Korea in the 1970s which contributed to narrowing the developmental 
gap between urban cities and rural communities over a decade. Its success can 
be attributed to its implementation of basic strategies of poverty reduction adapting 
to and making use of the Korean contexts—promoting opportunities and facilitating 
empowerment for rural people. Forty years ago, the people who designed and 
implemented Saemaul Undong did not have a clear understanding of the concepts 
and vocabularies that are broadly used in development today. What they promoted, 
achieved and implemented, however, was not different from the goals, objectives and 
methodologies that development practitioners promote today. The most important 
lesson learned from Saemaul Undong are that it devised appropriate strategies and 
measures reflecting and making use of the specific political, economic and social 
contexts. Developing countries should carefully study their own situation and devise 
workable and practical solutions of their own.
* Manager of the Evaluation Office, Korea International Cooperation Agency. This article was commissioned by 
ESCAP as part of the Regional Poverty Alleviation Programme: Replication of Best Practices in Rural Community 
Development (Saemaul Undong Phase II). The views and any conclusions reached in this article are those of the 
author and do not represent the policies of ESCAP or the Korea International Cooperation Agency.
1  The level of extreme poverty was estimated by 1993 purchasing power parity.
2  Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System, accessed from http://ecos.bok.or.kr.
3  The 1965 poverty figure is from Sang-Mok Seo (1981). “Definition of poverty and time series analysis” pp. 27-28, 
accessed from www.kdi.re.kr/kdi/report/report_read05.jsp?pub_no=00003580 on March 21 2008; the 2007 poverty 
figure is from Myung-Jae Sung (2008). “Analysis on the impact of fiscal policy on Income distribution structure and 
poverty rate”, Monthly Public Finance Forum, Korea Institute of Public Finance, No. 148, October, pp. 8-28.
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	 Though	 its	 economic	 development	 policy	 focused	 on	 industrial	 development,	
the	Republic	of	Korea	effectively	 reduced	rural	as	well	as	urban	poverty.	From	1970,	 the	
Government	 turned	 its	attention	 towards	balanced	growth	between	urban	cities	and	 rural	
communities	and	within	a	decade	managed	to	develop	rural	community	conditions	to	match	
those	of	 the	cities.	At	 the	centre	of	 this	 lies	Saemaul	Undong,4	 the	 integrated	community	
development	programme	of	the	Republic	of	Korea.		
	 This	 paper	 attempts	 to	 re-evaluate	 Saemaul	 Undong,	 focusing	 on	 its	 value	 as	
a	 rural	development	programme,	 identify	what	 it	 really	 is	and	draw	 lessons	applicable	 in	
current	development	practices.	To	do	so,	in	the	next	chapter,	the	initiation,	annual	progress	
and	 results	 of	Saemaul	Undong	will	 be	 explained,	 along	with	 its	 objectives,	 outputs	 and	
outcomes.	 Based	 on	 this	 assessment,	 chapter	 three	 will	 draw	 some	 key	 factors	 of	 its	
success,	and	chapter	four	will	identify	some	limitations	and	criticisms.	Finally,	chapter	five	
will	present	some	applicable	lessons	learned	and	implications	of	the	programme	for	today’s	
development	contexts.		
II. SAEMAUL UNDONG: PROGRESS AND RESULTS
	 It	is	very	difficult	to	define	Saemaul	Undong	due	to	the	constant	changes	in	its	scope	
and	 agenda.	 If	 one	 focuses	 exclusively	 on	 activities	 performed	 in	 rural	 areas	 from	1970	
to	 1979,	 however,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 find	 some	 common	 denominators	 shared	 throughout	
the	 entire	 movement.	 In	 short,	 Saemaul	 Undong	 was	 a	 community-based	 integrated	
rural	 development	 programme.	As	 each	Government	 of	 a	 developing	 country	 names	 its	
development	programmes	in	its	own	way,	Saemaul	Undong	was	a	brand	name	given	by	the	
Government	of	the	Republic	of	Korea.	Its	success	can	be	attributed	to	its	implementation	of	
basic	strategies	of	poverty	reduction	adapting	to	and	making	use	of	the	Korean	contexts—
promoting	opportunities	and	facilitating	empowerment	for	rural	people.	Forty	years	ago,	the	
people	who	designed	and	implemented	Saemaul	Undong	did	not	have	a	clear	understanding	
of	 the	 concepts	 and	 vocabularies	 that	 are	 broadly	 used	 in	 development	 today,	 such	 as	
good	governance,	capacity-building,	participatory	approach,	accountability,	empowerment,	
vertical	integration	or	ownership.	In	fact,	some	of	these	concepts	did	not	even	exist	at	that	
time.	What	they	promoted,	achieved	and	implemented,	however,	was	not	different	from	the	
goals,	objectives	and	methodologies	that	development	practitioners	promote	today.
4  In a broad sense, Saemaul Undong, which can be translated as “new village movement” in English, was aimed not 
only at rural development but also, in its latter stages, at various enlightenment activities implemented in industrial 
factories, the military and cities. It is still maintained in some cities and villages under the administration of the privatized 
organization called the National Council of Saemaul Undong Movement in Korea. In general, Saemaul Undong 
is associated with rural development activities in the 1970s and many studies also confine their research scope 
accordingly. In this paper, Saemaul Undong refers only to the rural development activities and projects from 1970 
to 1979 under President Park’s regime before the privatization of the programme by the successive Government.
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Initiation
	 The	Government	of	the	Republic	of	Korea	achieved	successful	economic	development	
in	the	1970s	with	the	adequate	usage	of	selective	industrial	policies	and	export-oriented	trade	
policies.	This	selective	strategy,	however,	put	rural	development	on	hold	and	widened	the	
gap	between	urban	and	rural	living	standards.	Discontent	with	the	Park	regime5	grew	among	
the	 rural	 population,	 and	 in	 the	national	 election	 of	 1969,	 the	approval	 rate	 of	 the	 ruling	
Democratic	Republican	Party	of	President	Park	fell	by	15	per	cent	even	in	the	rural	areas,	
which	 traditionally	 had	 been	 regarded	 as	 a	 favourable	 voting	 constituency	 for	 President	
Park.		
	 Saemaul	Undong	was	initiated	to	ameliorate	the	widening	gap	by	utilizing	resources	
accumulated	with	industrial	development.	In	the	winter	of	1970,	the	Government	received	
a	report	on	the	overproduction	of	cement	and	improvised	a	plan	to	distribute	the	excess	to	
rural	people.	The	Government	first	distributed	355	packs	of	cement	to	each	of	the	34,665	
rural	 communities	 free	of	 charge	with	one	 restriction:	 usage	 for	 the	welfare	of	 the	entire	
community.	The	plan	received	a	favourable	public	reaction	and	achieved	significant	results	
beyond	 the	Government’s	 prediction.	The	 cost	 of	 free	 cement	was	W4.1	 billion6	 but	 the	
estimated	monetary	value	of	the	projects	carried	out	by	the	rural	community	was	three	times	
the	cost,	at	W12.2	billion	(Park	and	Lee	1997).	Encouraged	by	the	success	and	incorporating	
the	 lessons	 learned	 from	 the	 previous	 rural	 development	 programmes,	 President	 Park	
elaborated	a	new	rural	development	programme,	naming	it	Saemaul	Undong.	
Objectives 
	 When	Saemaul	Undong	was	initiated,	it	did	not	have	an	official	definition	of	Saemaul	
Undong.	This	did	not	happen	until	1973,	when	 the	words	closest	 to	a	definition	could	be	
found	 in	President	Park’s	 impromptu	comments	at	 the	National	Convention	of	 the	Village	
Leaders:	“We	may	call	this	movement	as	the	movement	for	a	better	living”	(Park	1998,	p.	47).	
5  Jung-Hee Park led a military coup on May 16, 1961 and became the Chairman of the Supreme Council for National 
Reconstruction, which incapacitated the Jang Myun administration. He later discharged himself from the army and 
won the 1963 presidential election as the leader of the newly created Democratic Republican Party. With economic 
development as a main priority of his administration, he legitimized his rule with strong economic growth and the 
alleviation of abject poverty, and won the elections in 1967 and 1971. Though the Constitution of 1963 only allowed a 
person to serve as president for two consecutive terms, Park ran for the presidency a third time in 1971 by amending 
the constitution and had narrowly winning over Dae-Jung Kim. In October 1972, he declared a state of emergency, 
dissolved the National Assembly and suspended the Constitution. In December, a new “Yooshin” Constitution was 
approved, which opened the way for Park to be a lifetime president. Protests calling for the end of Park’s dictatorship 
grew larger among students and later became nationwide. On October 26, 1979, Park’s regime was ended with his 
assassination by Jae-Gyu Kim, the director of the National Intelligence Agency.
6  Approximately $6.8 million (using the exchange rate of $1=W310.58, from http://ecos.bok.or.kr.)
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This	was	later	interpreted	by	Park	Jin-whan,	special	assistant	to	the	President	for	Saemaul	
Undong,	as	a	movement	 to	develop	 the	work	ethics	of	 farmers	by	participating	 in	village	
projects	 to	 accelerate	 rural	 modernization	 (Park	 1998).	 Though	 different	 interpretations	
existed	regarding	how	to	define	the	objectives	of	Saemaul	Undong,	most	agreed	that	the	aim	
was	to	generate	economic,	social	and	attitudinal	improvements.	The	most	broadly	accepted	
objectives	are	(a)	 income	generation,	(b)	 living	environment	and	basic	rural	 infrastructure	
improvement,	and	(c)	capacity-building	and	attitudinal	change.
Annual progress
	 In	 accordance	 with	 the	 change	 in	 the	 focus	 and	 scope	 of	 village	 level	 projects,	
Saemaul	Undong	could	be	divided	into	three	phases.	In	the	initial	phase,	the	priority	at	the	
village	level	was	given	to	the	improvement	of	the	physical	infrastructure.	A	list	of	exemplary	
projects	 was	 developed	 by	 the	 Government	 and	 given	 to	 the	 villages	 as	 a	 guideline	 to	
help	villagers	to	develop	general	ideas	on	what	they	could	do	for	themselves.	As	villagers	
gained	more	confidence	 in	 their	ability	and	 the	basic	 infrastructure	necessary	 to	 improve	
agricultural	productivity,	Saemaul	Undong	shifted	its	focus,	and	income-generation	projects	
were	 gradually	 initiated	 while	 the	 scope	 and	 size	 of	 each	 living	 condition	 improvement	
project	 increased.	 In	 the	 last	phase,	 the	 focus	was	shifted	 towards	capacity-building	and	
attitudinal	 changes,	 while	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 projects	 became	 broader.	Activities	 in	 urban	
areas,	factories	and	corporations	became	more	common,	which	changed	Saemaul	Undong	
into	a	national	campaign.	With	the	demise	of	President	Park	in	1979,	the	new	Government	
decided	to	privatize	Saemaul	Undong.	In	1980,	the	non-governmental	Central	Headquarters	
for	Saemaul	Undong	was	established	and	with	that	Saemaul	Undong	as	the	Government-led	
rural	development	programme	ended.	
Outputs, outcomes and achievements    
	 Different	reviews	presented	different	interpretations	on	the	achievement	of	Saemaul	
Undong.	On	one	side,	some	argued	that	Saemaul	Undong	achieved	most	of	its	objectives	
and	brought	unprecedented	success	in	rural	development	based	on	Government	statistics	
which	showed	that	most	of	the	objectives	had	been	achieved.		
	 On	the	other	side,	some	have	claimed	that	surveys	and	data,	including	the	impact	of	
Saemaul	Undong	after	1979,	showed	a	different	picture.	They	argue	that,	though	it	was	true	
that	Saemaul	Undong	accomplished	 the	quantifiable	 objectives	 directed	 from	 the	 central	
Government	with	massive	resource	mobilization	and	the	enforcement	of	 the	authoritarian	
Government,	the	impact	was	not	sustained,	and	was	therefore	not	successful.	
	 This	section	will	show	that	Saemaul	Undong	brought	about	meaningful	improvements	
in	 the	 social	 development	 dimension:	 improvements	 in	 basic	 infrastructure;	 increased	
accountability	 of	 local	 governments;	 and	 the	 empowerment	 of	 villagers,	 while	 producing	
limited	impact	on	income	poverty	reduction	and	economic	development.
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Income generation and income poverty reduction
	 Various	 income-generation	 projects	 were	 implemented	with	 the	 aim	 of	 increasing	
rural	household	income	and	reducing	poverty.	New	agricultural	technologies	and	improved	
crop	varieties	were	introduced	and	the	usage	of	chemical	inputs	and	fertilizers	became	more	
widespread.	Improved	physical	infrastructure	helped	productivity	increase	and	income	grow	
by	opening	a	new	window	of	opportunity	for	villagers	to	venture	into	new	activities	and	by	
providing	efficient	access	 to	 the	markets,	 resources	and	assets	necessary	 for	 their	work.	
The	absolute	poverty	rate	decreased	in	1970	and	especially	in	1978,	when	the	proportion	of	
rural	people	in	total	absolute	poverty	was	less	than	that	of	urban	people	(table	1).	In	terms	
of	income,	rural	household	income	recorded	a	six-fold	increase	from	W255,800	in	1970	to	
W1,531,300	in	1979,	even	at	one	point	exceeding	that	of	urban	households	in	1976	(table	2).	
Income	sources	for	rural	people	also	became	diversified	and	the	portion	of	non-agricultural	
income	also	rose	(table	3).		
	 The	positive	 impact	of	Saemaul	Undong	on	 reducing	 rural	poverty	and	 increasing	
income	was,	however,	limited.	The	relative	poverty	rate	of	rural	areas	shot	up	again	to	11.2	
per	cent	in	1978	(table	1).	What	is	more	important	is	the	pertinaciously	low	level	of	agricultural	
income.	From	1963	to	1985,	the	ratio	of	per	capita	agricultural	income	to	per	capita	urban	
working	income	constantly	remained	below	40	per	cent	(table	4).	In	fact,	the	increase	in	rural	
household	income	in	the	1970s	was	mostly	due	to	the	heavy	subsidization	of	rice	prices	by	
the	Government	and	a	steady	increase	in	off-farm	employment	opportunities,	neither	of	which	
were	directly	linked	to	Saemaul	Undong.	Though	income-generation	projects	contributed	to	
agricultural	productivity	growth	and	increasing	incomes,	the	causal	relation	between	the	two	
was	not	as	strong	and	direct	as	that	of	the	high	price	policy	(Park	and	Ahn	1999).	
	 The	decrease	in	the	number	of	poor	people	in	rural	areas	could	also	be	due	to	the	
transfer	of	 poverty	 to	urban	areas.	As	 the	portion	of	urban	population	 to	 total	 population	
increased	from	34	per	cent	in	1966	to	57	per	cent	in	1980,	the	portion	of	urban	people	in	
poverty	proportionately	rose	from	34	per	cent	in	1965	to	56	per	cent	in	1978	(Seo	1981).	
This	implied	that,	despite	Saemaul	Undong,	urban	migration	continued	and	subsequently,	
rural	poor	people,	seeking	a	high	labour	wage,	migrated	to	form	part	of	the	urban	poor.			
	 In	conclusion,	while	Saemaul	Undong	helped	 to	alleviate	absolute	poverty	 in	 rural	
villages	 by	 providing	 better	 access	 and	 opportunities,	 it	 was	 not	 sufficient	 to	 address	
the	 structural	 problems	 of	 agriculture,	 which	 required	much	more	 physical	 and	 financial	
investment	and	drastic	changes	in	agricultural	policies	rather	than	the	massive	mobilization	
of	human	labour.
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Table 1. Change in the poverty rate and the number of people living in poverty
(Thousands	of	people,	percentage)
1965 1970 1978
Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total
Number of 
people in 
absolute 
poverty
(thousands)
4 244 7 505 11 749 2 006 5 548 7 554 2 552 1 995 4 547
Distribution 
of people 
in absolute 
poverty 
(percentage)
36.1 63.9 100.0 26.6 73.4 100.0 56.1 43.9 100.0
Absolute 
poverty rate
54.9 35.8 40.9 16.2 27.9 23.4 13.75 10.80 12.28
Relative 
poverty rate 
(percentage)
17.9 10.0 12.2 7.0 3.4 4.8 16.6 11.2 13.9
Source:	Data	based	on	Sang-Mok	Seo	(1981).	“Definition	of	poverty	and	time	series	analysis”,	accessed	
from	www.kdi.re.kr/kdi/report/report_read05.jsp?pub_no=00003580	on	March	21	2008.	
Note:		 In	this	study,	absolute	poverty	is	defined	as	a	monthly	household	income	which	is	below	W20,000	
for	 an	 urban	 household	 and	W17,000	 for	 a	 rural	 household.	Relative	 poverty	 is	 defined	 as	 a	
household	 income	 lower	 than	 one	 third	 of	 the	 average	 national	 household	 income	 level	 (all	
incomes	are	estimated	in	1980	Korean	won).
Table 2. Ratio of rural household income to urban household income
(Unit:	Korean	won)
Year Average monthly income 
of urban household (A)
Average monthly income 
of rural household (B)
Ratio 
(B)/(A) ( percentage )
1967  20 720  12 456  60.1
1970  31 770  21 317  67.1
1973  45 850  40 059  87.4
1976  95 980  96 355 100.4
1979 219 133 185 624  84.7
Source:	Soon-Won	 Kwon	 (1997).	 “Korean	 experience	 in	 poverty	 alleviation	 with	 special	 reference	 to	
the	 Saemaul	 Undong”,	Social Security Review,	 vol.	 13,	 No.	 1,	 June	 (Korean	 Social	 Security	
Association),	p.	194.
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Table 3. Farming household income in the 1970s
(Unit:	Korean	won)
Year Household 
income
Agricultural income Non-agricultural income
Amount Amount Ratio 
(percentage)
Amount Ratio 
(percentage)
1970   255 800   194 000 75.9  61 800 24.1
1973   480 700   390 300 81.2  90 400 18.8
1976 1 156 300   921 200 79.7 235 100 20.3
1979 1 531 300 1 531 000 68.7 696 200 31.3
Source:	National	Council	 of	Saemaul	Undong	Movement	 in	Korea	 (1999)	 “Saemaul	Undong	 in	Korea”,	
p.	38,	accessed	from	www.saemaul.com/center/www/caups/down/issue/새마을운동(영문).pdf	on	
25	March	2008.	
Table 4. Comparison of per capita rural income to urban income
(Unit:	thousands	of	Korean	won)
Year Urban household Rural household Ratio
Per capita
income (A)
Per capita 
working 
income (B)
Per capita 
income (C)
Per capita 
agricultural 
income (D)
(C/A) (D/B)
1963    12    60    15    24 1.22 0.40
1965    16    92    18    28 1.09 0.31
1970    55   254    43    67 0.79 0.26
1975   140   538   155   250 1.11 0.43
1980   558 2 144   527   705 0.94 0.33
1985 1 087 3 912 1 220 1 492 1.12 0.38
Source:	Lee,	Dong-Pil	and	others	(2004).	Analysis on Cause and Trend of Rural-Urban Gap in Income and 
Development Level,	Research	R490-1	(Seoul,	Korea	Rural	Economics	Institute).
Note:	 The	income	is	calculated	in	nominal	price.
Living environment improvement and basic rural infrastructure establishment
	 It	seems	that	Saemaul	Undong	led	to	substantial	improvements	in	rural	infrastructure	
(table	5).	In	fact,	most	studies	concur	that	Saemaul	Undong	brought	significant	improvements	
in	 the	 rural	 living	 environment	 and	 infrastructure.	 Enlarged	 and	 extended	 roads	 made	
mechanized	 farming	 possible,	 while	 the	 extension	 of	 telephone	 lines	 and	 electrification	
provided	timely	information	and	enabled	villagers	to	cope	with	changing	market	situations.	
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The	improvement	consequently	created	a	virtuous	circle	of	human	development.	Improved	
basic	 infrastructure	 helped	 to	 increase	 productivity	 and	 income,	 with	 better	 access	 and	
wider	opportunities,	while	also	creating	a	healthier	environment	with	better	sanitation.	Their	
experience	 of	 cooperation	with	 the	Government	 provided	 learning-by-doing	 opportunities	
for	 building	 capacities	 in	 project	 management.	 It	 also	 boosted	 confidence	 and	 changed	
attitudes,	which	 led	 to	 the	empowerment	of	people	 in	 the	villages	and	 transformations	 in	
local	governance.
Table 5. Major achievements of some Saemaul Undong projects in the 1970s
Sources:	 Chang-Soo	Choe	 (2005).	 "Key	 Factors	 to	 Successful	 Community	 Development:	 The	 Korean	
Experience",	Discussion	Paper	No.	 39,	November,	 Institute	 of	Developing	Economies	 (Chiba,	
Japan,	 JETRO),	 p.	 5,	 as	 cited	 in	National	Council	 of	 Saemaul	Undong,	 “Saemaul	Undong	 in	
Korea”	(1999),	p.	24,	table	1;	and	Sung-hwan	Ban,	“Development	of	the	rural	infrastructure	and	
the	Saemaul	Undong”,	appendix	table	1	in	Man-Gap	Lee	(1981).	ed.,	Toward a New Community 
Life,	Seoul	National	University	Institute	of	Saemaul	Undong	Studies	p.	321,	as	cited	in	appendix	
table	1.
Note:		 Table	is	based	on	data	from	articles	by	Sung-hwan	Ban	and	Chang-Soo	Choe.	
Project Unit Target Performance Ratio
(percentage)
Village roads expansion Km   26 266  43 558 166
Farm feeder roads construction Km   49 167  61 797 126
Small bridge construction Ea   76 749  79 516 104
Small reservoirs construction Ea   10 122  10 742 106
Traditional small irrigation (channel) Ea   22 787  28 352 124
Traditional small irrigation (raceway) Km    4 043   4 442 109
Traditional small irrigation (embankment) Km   17 239   9 180 53
Village centre construction Ea   35 608  37 012 104
Public warehouse construction Ea   34 665  22 143 64
Housing improvement Ea 544 000 225 000 42
Village layout renovation Ea - 2 747 -
Sewage system upgrade/construction Km 8 654 15 559 179
Electricity supply system installation Household 2 834 000 2 777 500 98
Telephone lines - 345 240
Saemaul factory construction/operation Ea 950 717 75
Reforestation Ha 744 354 347 153 47
UN-16-2December09	CH5_113-140_E3.indd			120 1/16/10			5:45	AM
121
Asia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 16, No. 2, December 2009
Capacity-building and attitudinal change
	 The	Ministry	of	Home	Affairs’	conception	of	rural	villagers	was	not	very	different	from	
the	 stereotypical	 traditional	 interpretation	 of	 them	 that	 outside	 development	 agents	 held	
at	 that	 time.	The	Ministry’s	view	of	 farmers	was	 that	 they	were	conservative,	unwilling	 to	
participate	in	cooperative	efforts,	hedonistic	and	lazy.	The	Ministry	ascribed	these	bad	habits	
and	negative	attitudes	to	low	agricultural	productivity	and	chronic	poverty	and	argued	that	
rural	development	was	only	possible	with	significant	changes	in	rural	people’s	attitudes.	The	
Ministry	attempted	to	change	their	pessimistic	and	fatalistic	attitude	and	promoted	modern	
values	 focusing	 on	 three	 core	 values—diligence,	 cooperation	 and	 self-reliance	 through	
large-scale	training,	seminars	and	workshops.
	 Saemaul	 Undong	 received	 some	 favourable	 responses	 and	 achieved	 some	
meaningful	 results	 in	 its	campaign	 for	attitudinal	change.	More	 than	500,000	people	 took	
part	in	Saemaul	Undong	trainings	from	1972	to	1979.	Based	on	a	survey	of	the	150	Saemaul	
Undong	leaders,	conducted	in	1974,	38	per	cent	chose	increased	cooperation	spirit	among	
villagers	 as	 the	most	 positive	 result	 brought	 about	 by	 Saemaul	 Undong	 (Park	 1974).	 In	
another	survey,	villagers	chose	changes	in	behaviour,	spirit	of	cooperation	and	confidence	
of	a	better	future	as	positive	changes	made	possible	by	Saemaul	Undong	(Brandt	and	Lee	
1979).	
	 Bad	habits	and	old	attitudes,	however,	were	not	the	main	causes	of	rural	economic	
difficulties.	The	sluggish	agricultural	 productivity	growth	and	persistent	poverty	had	more	
to	do	with	the	failure	of	the	Government	to	deliver	essential	assistance	and	resources	or	to	
provide	people	with	effective	measures	to	cope	with	deteriorating	terms	of	trade.	Some	of	
the	spirits	and	attitude	that	Saemaul	Undong	tried	to	promote,	moreover,	did	not	need	further	
encouragement.	
	 The	culmination	of	all	those	so-called	attitudinal	changes	was	in	the	empowerment	
of	 people	and	 improvements	 in	 local	 governance.	Saemaul	Undong	created	an	enabling	
environment	 where	 rural	 people	 voiced	 their	 opinions	 and	 made	 themselves	 heard.	
Government	agencies	and	officials	were	considered	as	potential	sources	of	assistance	rather	
than	as	 feared	exploiters.	The	 latter	part	of	 this	chapter	will	first	examine	 the	meaning	of	
changes	in	three	core	values	that	Saemaul	Undong	promoted,	and	will	review	the	attitudinal	
changes	that	were	inadvertently	brought	forth	but	contributed	to	social	development	in	rural	
villages.
Diligence
	 It	seemed	that	designating	laziness	as	one	of	the	main	causes	of	rural	poverty	was	
overstretching	 the	 logic.	 Korean	 farmers,	 as	 with	 other	 farmers	 in	 developing	 countries,	
seemed	to	have	lived	a	very	challenging	life.	Farm	wives,	for	example,	had	to	raise	children,	
make	clothes,	do	the	laundry,	cook	meals,	collect	firewood,	fetch	water,	work	all	day	in	the	
fields	and	do	some	additional	side	jobs.	It	was	even	more	absurd	to	assert	that,	before	1971,	
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farmers	held	values	that	made	them	lazy,	while	at	the	same	time	workers	in	the	city,	who	
were	mostly	of	farm	origin,	created	the	industrial	“miracle”	(Brandt	1981).	If	there	was	a	new	
industriousness	linked	to	the	success	of	Saemaul	Undong,	it	would	be	caused	by	the	new	
opportunities	 and	 resources	 created	 for	 profitable	 agriculture	 rather	 than	by	a	 change	 in	
values	(Brandt	1981).
Self-reliance
	 Saemaul	Undong	contributed	to	rural	farmers	becoming	self-sufficient	and	free	from	
shortages	of	food	by	being	able	to	produce	enough	food	for	themselves,	and	more	confident	
about	their	capability.	There	was,	however,	a	built-in	contradiction	associated	with	the	goal	
of	 self-reliance	 since	 the	 changes	 brought	 about	 by	 Saemaul	 Undong	 required	 further	
outside	assistance	 (Brandt	1981).	Commercial	 farming	 required	continuous	 technological	
development	and	adaptation	to	the	market	situation.	It	also	had	an	intrinsic	vulnerability	to	
external	shocks.	Self-reliance	became	difficult	for	farmers	due	to	the	increased	uncertainties	
that	accompanied	their	shift	 from	subsistence	to	commercialized	agriculture.	Dependency	
on	the	Government	actually	increased	in	many	ways,	and	government	officials	complained	
that	villages	were	always	asking	for	help	instead	of	trying	to	help	themselves,	while	farmers	
complained	of	patronizing	bureaucratic	superiority	(Brandt	1981).
Cooperation
	 Most	Asian	rural	communities,	including	Korean	rural	villages,	shared	the	traditional	
values	of	cooperation	developed	throughout	a	long	history	of	agricultural	cultivation.	Saemaul	
Undong	 linked	 the	 traditional	 sense	 of	 cooperation	 to	 individual	 gains	 and	modified	 the	
concept	to	fit	into	the	modernization	process.	In	the	beginning,	the	Government	increased	
“participation”	by	mobilizing	villagers	through	coercive	pressure.		Later,	as	people	gradually	
realized	the	benefit	of	village	activities,	voluntary	cooperation	started	to	take	place.	Over	a	
period	of	several	years,	people	learned	how	to	work	together	to	develop	estimates	on	the	
resources	required,	to	get	necessary	assistance	from	outside	and	to	motivate	some	reluctant	
farmers.	This	calculated	cooperation,	however,	 later	became	obsolete	 in	 the	new	society	
built	by	Saemaul	Undong	itself.	The	increase	of	cash	crop	farmers	and	the	commercialization	
of	 agriculture,	which	was	 less	 dependent	 on	 cooperation	with	 one	another	 and	more	on	
machines	and	technologies,	undermined	the	cooperation	and	solidarity	found	in	the	village	
institutions	in	the	past	(Brandt	1981).		Individualism	steadily	penetrated	rural	society,	fostered	
by	the	mass	media,	commercialized	agriculture	and	rampant	commercialism	(Brandt	1981).
Participation and empowerment of people
	 As	much	as	it	was	top-down	and	centralized,	Saemaul	Undong	was	almost	equally	
bottom-up	 in	 some	 ways	 despite	 the	 political	 and	 social	 atmosphere	 in	 the	 Republic	 of	
Korea	at	 that	 time.	While	 the	main	 role	of	 the	central	Government	was	 limited	 to	 leading	
and	 coordinating	 the	 nationwide	 activities	 of	 the	 various	 stakeholders,	 villagers,	 at	 the	
opposite	end,	took	responsibility	for	village	level	activities,	tailoring	them	to	the	needs	and	
circumstances	of	the	communities.			
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	 Saemaul	Undong	also	introduced	a	new	kind	of	community-based	leadership,	which	
was	different	 from	that	of	 the	traditional	village	chiefs.	While	village	chiefs	had	been	paid	
and	appointed	by	the	Government	from	among	old	villagers,	Saemaul	Undong	leaders	were	
elected	by	the	villagers	usually	among	relatively	young	people	and	served	the	villages	without	
any	compensation.	They	represented	the	 interests	of	 their	villages	to	the	 local	authorities	
and	sometimes	did	not	hesitate	to	challenge	or	confront	the	local	officials.	Under	this	new	
leadership,	the	villagers	worked	together	for	a	common	goal.	The	new	experience	allowed	
the	people	to	realize	their	capacity	and	empowered	them	vis-à-vis	the	Government.	
	 The	empowerment,	however,	was	a	limited	experience	with	regard	to	development	
issues	 and	 was	 never	 further	 developed	 or	 transferred	 to	 become	 fully	 fledged	 political	
activism.	Villagers	were	well	aware	that	they	were	participating	in	a	campaign	initiated	and	
implemented	by	the	Government.	Their	participation	was	also	strictly	limited	to	the	activities	
relevant	to	Saemaul	Undong.	They	also	knew	that,	though	the	local	government	agents	were	
helping	them,	the	agents	could	always	turn	into	watchdogs	for	the	Government.
Change in local governance
	 The	Government	officials	historically	regarded	rural	villagers	as	subjects	of	their	rule,	
while	villagers	tended	to	perceive	the	officials	as	exploiters	imposing	difficult	rules	upon	them.	
This	mutual	discordance	created	distrust	between	the	two	sides,	which	had	been	a	serious	
obstacle	to	the	introduction	of	Government-led	campaigns	in	rural	villages.		With	Saemaul	
Undong,	the	traditional	role	of	local	governments	changed	from	being	an	instrument	of	the	
central	Government	to	a	rural	development	agent	assisting	villagers.	The	local	government	
linked	villagers’	needs	to	central	Government	directives	and	channelled	the	voice	from	the	
field	 into	Government	policy.	With	 the	help	of	Saemaul	 leaders,	 it	 delivered	Government	
services	 and	 assistance	 to	 rural	 villages	 and	 coordinated	 various	 kinds	 of	 Government	
support	 to	avoid	any	confusion,	unnecessary	duplication	and	conflicts.	Local	government	
policies	accordingly	became	more	representative	of	their	constituents.
Gender and Saemaul Undong
	 As	 in	many	other	developing	countries,	women	 in	 the	Republic	of	Korea	were	not	
traditionally	welcome	to	engage	in	social	issues.	Saemaul	Undong	opened	a	small	window	
of	opportunity	 for	 rural	women	 to	officially	participate	 in	social	activities	and	engage	with	
the	government.	Initially,	their	participation	was	limited	to	continue	the	so-called	“women’s	
work”;	however,	they	gradually	increased	their	involvement	in	village	activities.	Some	of	the	
Saemaul	woman	leaders	proactively	initiated	and	successfully	implemented	projects	which	
were	 considered	part	 of	men’s	 domain.	The	 tenacious	efforts	made	and	 the	outstanding	
achievements	 accomplished	 by	 women	 made	 the	 public	 appreciate	 their	 capacity	 and	
positively	changed	the	general	view	of	women’s	role	in	society.	
	 Though	the	contribution	and	achievement	of	women	in	Saemaul	Undong	positively	
changed	the	conservative	attitude	towards	women,	it	did	not	lead	to	sustainable	awareness	
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of	women’s	 rights	 in	 society,	 nor	 did	 it	 create	 systematic	 institutional	 changes	 inside	 the	
Government	 for	 the	 empowerment	 of	 women.	 The	 encouragement	 by	 the	 Government	
for	the	further	engagement	of	women	was	partly	to	address	the	feminization	of	agriculture	
and	 rural	 villages	 caused	 by	massive	migration	 of	men	 to	 urban	 areas	 (Cho	 and	Tinker	
1981).	From	the	beginning,	there	was	no	such	strategy	developed	for	gender	mainstreaming	
to	 address	 the	 deep-rooted	 social	 bias	 and	 discrimination	 against	women.	 	The	 positive	
changes	were	solely	brought	about	by	women’s	own	efforts,	which	were	not	scaled	up	into	
policy	or	institutional	change.
III. FACTORS FOR SUCCESS
	 Many	factors	can	be	attributed	to	the	achievements	of	Saemaul	Undong.	While	some	
are	context-specific	circumstances	which	created	a	favourable	environment	for	community-
based	rural	development	programmes,	others	are	policies	deliberately	designed	for	Saemaul	
Undong.	This	chapter	first	identifies	favourable	pre-conditions	specific	to	the	Korean	context,	
lists	policies	and	strategies	developed	specifically	by	the	Government	for	Saemaul	Undong,	
and	finally	details	village-level	contributions.
Pre-conditions
Homogeneous communities with strong tradition of cooperation
	 Rural	 communities	 in	 the	 Republic	 of	 Korea	 had	 some	 distinct	 features:	 a	 long	
history	 of	 settlement	 by	 people	 usually	 related	 to	 each	 other	 by	 kinship;	 rice	 farming	 as	
their	 main	 economic	 activity;	 and	 sharing	 traditional	 customs	 and	 autonomous	 norms	
based	on	Confucian	teaching.	Ethnic	homogeneity	also	contributed	much	towards	cohesive	
cooperation,	 thus	 reducing	 the	possibility	of	disputes	and	conflicts.	Like	many	other	 rural	
villages	 in	Asian	 countries,	 rural	 villagers	 in	 the	Republic	 of	 Korea	 had,	 for	 a	 long	 time,	
already	 known	 and	 realized	 the	 benefits	 of	 cooperation.	 Each	 village	 also	 had	 its	 own	
autonomous	rules	and	customs	for	cooperation	called	doorae, gyae	and	hyang-yak.	Doorae	
is	a	more	than	500-year-old	tradition	of	cooperation	to	do	the	difficult	work	that	could	not	
be	 done	 by	 one	 household.	Gyae	 is	 a	 small	 savings	 scheme	 especially	 popular	 among	
housewives.	 The	 age-old	 tradition	 called	 hyang-yak	 is	 an	 autonomous	 customary	 norm	
promoting	cooperation	and	good	deeds	among	villagers,	based	on	its	Confucian	tradition.	
This	rich	social	capital	in	rural	villages	made	rural	people	feel	less	hostile	towards	Saemaul	
Undong	since	collaboration	for	the	common	good	was	not	a	foreign	idea.	Saemaul	Undong	
in	turn	further	developed	the	traditional	exercise	of	cooperation	to	be	more	deliberate	and	
sophisticated.	
Egalitarian society with land reform
	 It	 has	 been	 noted	 that	 large	 inequalities	 in	 assets,	 such	 as	 property	 and	 land,	
and	 prestige	 have	 a	 tendency	 to	 reduce	 community	 solidarity,	 and	 often	make	 the	 task	
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of	 creating	 viable	 participatory	 organizations	 and	 projects	 impossible	 (Goldsmith	 1981).	
Disproportionate	control	of	assets	and	resources	by	a	small	number	of	local	elites	increased	
the	risk	of	local	capture	and	the	domination	of	benefits	of	a	development	programme	by	the	
local	elites,	hindering	the	possible	impact	of	any	community	development	programme.
	 Undoubtedly,	one	of	the	major	reasons	for	the	relative	success	of	Saemaul	Undong	
is	 the	 egalitarian	 rural	 village	 structure	 created	 after	 the	 comprehensive	 land	 reform.	 In	
1950,	 the	 Government	 enacted	 a	 land	 reformation	 law,	 which	 prohibited	 tenant	 farming	
and	put	a	ceiling	on	 land	ownership	of	only	 three	hectares	of	 land	per	person.	The	 land	
reform	practically	 got	 rid	 of	major	 absentee	 landlords	 from	 rural	 villages,	which,	 coupled	
with	migration	 to	 the	cities	of	both	rich	peasants	and	 landless	and	near-landless	 tenants,	
had	the	effect	of	 levelling	incomes	and	homogenizing	the	rural	population.	In	1970,	when	
Saemaul	Undong	was	 initiated,	 94	per	 cent	 of	 rural	 households	held	 farms	 smaller	 than	
two	hectares,	while	 64	per	 cent	 held	 less	 than	one	hectare	 (Goldsmith	1981).	 	With	 the	
demise	 of	 traditional	 ruling	 elites,	 the	 social	 and	political	 structure	 in	 the	 village	became	
more	equitable.	The	relatively	egalitarian	structure	was	favourable	to	Saemaul	Undong	with	
villagers	in	similarly	poor	situations	and	few	possibilities	of	local	capture.
Solid and continuous economic growth
	 Many	 Governments	 in	 developing	 countries	 often	 face	 difficulties	 in	 pursuing	
their	 development	 programmes	 due	 to	 budgetary	 constraints.	 Needing	 to	 overcome	 the	
multifaceted	challenges	of	poverty	and	constrained	by	limited	financial	sources,	developing	
countries	 could	 not	 usually	 commit	 themselves	 to	 long-term	 development	 programmes.	
Having	learned	the	importance	of	physical	assistance	after	the	failure	of	the	previous	rural	
development	programme,	the	Government	of	the	Republic	of	Korea	utilized	resources	made	
available	by	sustained	economic	growth	to	support	Saemaul	Undong.	The	constant	economic	
growth	mitigated	the	extra	burden	of	expenditure	incurred	by	Saemaul	Undong.	The	ratio	of	
the	Government	assistance	for	Saemaul	Undong	to	tax	revenue	was	on	average	2.48	per	
cent	and	did	not	go	above	5	per	cent	at	any	point	except	in	1975.	Strong	and	continuous	
economic	 growth	 increased	 tax	 revenue,	which	 allowed	 the	Government	 to	 continuously	
support	and	lead	the	programme	with	little	budgetary	concern.	Sustained	economic	growth	
also	helped	to	increase	the	market	for	agricultural	products	by	raising	the	income	of	urban	
industrial	workers	who	were	at	the	same	time	major	consumers	of	rural	products.		
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National leadership and political commitment
	 It	has	been	argued	that	no	policies	or	programmes	can	be	successfully	implemented	
without	 the	 commitment	 of	 the	 Government,	 and	 Saemaul	 Undong	 was	 no	 exception.	
Strong	commitment	and	leadership	from	the	very	top	played	a	crucial	part	 in	 its	success.	
It	was	President	Park,	with	 his	 strong	will	 and	 commitment,	who	 initiated,	 designed	 and	
provided	continuous	support	for	Saemaul	Undong.	He	made	Saemaul	Undong	a	top	priority	
of	 his	 Government,	 checking	 monthly	 progress,	 inviting	 villagers	 to	 cabinet	 meetings	 to	
give	 presentations,	 and	making	 surprise	 visits	 to	 villages	 and	 training	 centres.	A	 strong	
commitment	from	the	top	leader	enabled	effective	vertical	 integration	 linking	all	 the	 levels	
of	 government	 and	 created	 a	 holistic	 approach	 horizontally	 mobilizing	 resources	 and	
coordinating	plans	among	the	relevant	ministries.	With	Saemaul	Undong	a	top	Government	
priority,	Government	officials	made	significant	efforts	for	the	programme’s	success	as	they	
knew	their	personal	gains,	such	as	promotion,	were	dependent	on	their	performance.	
Policies and strategies of the Government
Holistic approach
	 Saemaul	 Undong	 took	 a	 distinctive	 holistic	 approach	 by	 combining	 training	 in	
capacity-building	and	institution-building	with	physical	development	activities	based	on	the	
villagers’	needs.	The	programme	started	with	 relatively	small	projects	 that	could	produce	
distinctive	changes	in	the	village	but	be	accomplished	relatively	easily	so	that	the	villagers	
could	realize	their	capacity	and	build	confidence	in	themselves.	At	the	same	time,	it	provided	
training	 on	 sharing	 the	 practical	 experiences	 of	 Saemaul	 leaders	 in	 successful	 villages	
and	delivering	practical	knowledge	and	technical	skills	necessary	for	project	management.	
Villagers	could	better	manage	their	activities	with	newly	acquired	knowledge,	which	in	turn	
produced	better	results	and	strengthened	their	confidence	even	further,	creating	a	virtuous	
circle	of	development.
	 Saemaul	 Undong	 also	 comprehensively	 dealt	 with	 various	 challenges	 that	 the	
villagers	identified,	coping	with	the	multidimensional	challenge	of	poverty.	By	not	focusing	
on	a	specific	challenge,	 it	efficiently	dealt	with	 the	diverse	but	 interlinked	adversities	 that	
rural	villages	faced.	Under	broad	Government	guidelines,	priorities	were	determined	by	the	
people	and	were	carried	out	step	by	step.	
Horizontal coordination 
	 To	 effectively	 address	 the	 multidimensionality	 of	 poverty	 and	 to	 deliver	 the	
comprehensive	 development	 plan	 package	 in	 cooperation	 with	 rural	 villagers,	 the	
Government	of	the	Republic	of	Korea	devised	a	distinct	approach	of	horizontal	coordination.	
The	Government	 delegated	 the	authority	 of	 coordination	 to	 the	Ministry	 of	Home	Affairs,	
under	which	 all	 relevant	ministries	were	mobilized.	A	 committee,	 chaired	 by	 the	Minister	
of	 Home	Affairs,	 was	 formed	 in	 the	 central	Government	 and	 the	 relevant	ministries	 and	
organizations	discussed	and	coordinated	their	plans	under	the	guidance	of	the	Ministry	of	
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Home	Affairs.	In	each	level	of	local	government,	a	special	committee	for	coordination	was	
also	 created.	Comprehensive	 development	 plans	 for	 each	 village	were	managed	 by	 the	
relevant	department	congruent	to	their	work	and	channelled	up	to	the	relevant	ministries	in	
the	central	Government,	effectively	covering	all	the	issues	concerned.
Vertical integration
	 Using	 the	 centralized	 and	 hierarchical	 administrative	 system,	 Saemaul	 Undong	
effectively	 created	 vertical	 integration	 linking	 villages,	 local	 governments	 and	 the	 central	
Government.	Each	level	of	government	managed	programmes	under	its	control	and	reported	
to	 the	 higher	 level	 authority.	 The	 central	 Government	 provided	 general	 guidelines	 and	
directions	and	coordinated	the	overall	management	of	the	plan.	The	local	government	acted	
as	a	pipeline	conveying	the	voices	from	the	villages	to	the	top	and	transferring	directions	from	
the	top	to	the	village.	Local	governments	were	permitted	to	modify	at	their	own	discretion	
the	action	plans	under	 their	 jurisdiction	 to	some	extent	 reflecting	 local	conditions	and	 the	
opinions	of	the	villagers.	Each	level	of	local	government	was	also	accountable	for	monitoring	
and	coordinating	the	activities	of	the	lower	level	governments.	From	the	central	Government	
to	the	villages,	government	officials	and	villagers	were	linked	vertically,	which	made	effective	
communication	and	cooperation	possible.
Incentive system and competition
	 The	selective	approach	taken	by	the	Government	acted	as	strong	motivation	for	the	
people	to	be	actively	involved.	In	1973,	based	on	performance	evaluation,	the	Government	
disqualified	 6,108	 villages	 out	 of	 a	 total	 of	 some	 30,000	 villages	 from	 receiving	 further	
assistance	for	the	following	year.	The	principle	of	“more	assistance	to	more	successful	villages”	
acted	as	an	effective	stimulator,	increasing	competition	among	villages	and	promoting	more	
participation	for	better	achievement	(Kim	2000).	Later,	the	Government	classified	all	the	rural	
villages	 into	 three	 categories	and	selectively	provided	 villages	with	assistance,	 favouring	
those	advancing	towards	a	“self-sustainable	community”	while	spurring	the	lagging	villages	
to	catch	up	with	others.		
	 Conversely,	 the	 Government	 also	 provided	 successful	 villages	 and	 their	 leaders	
with	 rewards.	 They	 were	 regarded	 as	 national	 heroes	 and	 presented	 their	 stories	 at	
cabinet	meetings	and	training	courses	and	in	schools.	Local	government	officials,	with	their	
personal	 interests	regularly	at	stake,	sometimes	every	day,	visited	rural	villages	and	kept	
detailed	records	of	village	achievements.	The	strong	message	from	the	top	was	that	rural	
development	was	a	national	priority	and	it	was	to	be	implemented	through	Saemaul	Undong,	
and	that	they	would	be	held	accountable	for	its	success	(Goldsmith	1981).
Capacity-building training programmes
	 Practical	 and	 experience-based	 training	 was	 given	 to	 more	 than	 500,000	 people	
during	the	course	of	Saemaul	Undong	from	1972	to	1980	(Park	1974).	Programmes	provided	
practical	skills	and	 technologies	on	project	management	and	new	 tools	and	 technologies	
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in	 agriculture.	 Practical	 knowledge	 gained	 from	 training	 programmes	 helped	 to	 improve	
their	living	standards,	which	in	turn	led	the	villagers	to	change	their	traditional	attitude	and	
strengthen	the	lessons	of	attitudinal	change	provided	by	other	training.	Training	also	provided	
the	participants	with	a	chance	to	share	knowledge	and	exchange	views	on	their	failures	and	
successes	while	serving	as	a	communication	channel	relaying	the	suggestions	and	opinions	
of	the	participants	to	the	government.		
Public relations
	 Mass	media	 from	 television	and	 radio	 to	newspapers	and	magazines	were	widely	
and	extensively	 utilized	 for	 disseminating	 information	on,	 drawing	more	attention	 to,	 and	
participation	in	Saemaul	Undong.	Under	the	management	of	the	Ministry	of	Home	Affairs,	all	
three	domestic	television	channels	and	radio	channels	frequently	broadcasted	updated	news	
and	success	stories.	During	the	Saemaul	Undong	period,	early	in	the	morning	each	day,	all	
radio	channels	broadcasted	 the	Saemaul	song	and	special	programmes	on	village	news	
and	stories.	This	massive	public	 relations	drive	certainly	helped	 to	deliver	 the	necessary	
information	 to	 the	 villagers	 and	 to	 promote	 broader	 participation	 and	 engagement.	 The	
messages,	however,	were	disproportionately	dominated	by	dramatic	success	stories	and	
mostly	 served	 the	 interest	 of	 the	 Government	 rather	 than	 channelling	 the	 voices	 of	 the	
bottom	to	the	top.	
Village level efforts
Community participation 
	 For	 any	 rural	 development	 programme	 to	 be	 successful,	 active	 participation	
and	 ownership	 among	 villagers	 is	 a	 prerequisite.	With	Saemaul	Undong,	 the	 tradition	 of	
cooperation	developed	to	become	calculated	participation	with	the	experience	of	consensus	
building,	and	collective	decision-making	and	implementation	in	managing	village	projects.7	
According	to	a	report	by	the	Ministry	of	Home	Affairs,	between	1971	and	1979,	each	rural	
person	 contributed	12	days	of	work	 per	 year,	 totalling	 1.1	 billion	work	 days,	 to	Saemaul	
Undong.	In	1978,	a	large-scale	survey	done	by	the	Korea	Rural	Economic	Institute	showed	
that	67	per	cent	of	the	respondents	said	that	they	attended	all	the	village	meetings	held	in	
their	villages,	while	another	28	per	cent	said	they	attended	often	(Boyer	and	Ahn	1991).	
	 A	 close	 linkage	 between	 personal	 interests	 and	 village	 projects	 can	 be	 ascribed	
as	 the	 main	 reason	 for	 the	 active	 participation.	 When	 the	 programme	 began,	 village	
level	participation	was	mobilized	by	 the	 local	government	and	was	 limited	 to	 the	passive	
provision	 of	 labour.	 Having	 observed	 the	 positive	 changes	 and	 realized	 the	 possible	
benefits,	villagers	gradually	became	more	proactive.	Under	the	limited	autonomy	they	had	in	
7  Cooperation in Saemaul Undong could be said to be more goal-oriented and systemized. The Saemaul council 
systematically managed cooperation projects, which were evaluated to see whether they achieved their target or 
not. In this sense, cooperation in the programme was more systematic compared to traditional collaboration among 
people.
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implementing	projects,	they	became	actively	engaged	in	village-level	decision-making	and	
the	implementation	process.	The	selective	assistance	approach	and	public	relations	drive	by	
the	Government	increased	the	villagers’	interest	and	the	competition	among	them.	Greater	
assistance	to	more	successful	village	policies	led	to	a	spirit	of	competition	among	villages,	
resulting	in	the	increased	participation	of	villagers.8	The	massive	dissemination	of	success	
stories	via	the	mass	media	also	attributed	to	promoting	a	more	competitive	spirit,	positive	
attitude	and	hope	for	change	among	the	villagers.
	 The	 active	 participation	 that	 the	 Government	 intended	 to	 promote	 was	 probably	
not	for	promoting	grass-roots	representative	democracy	in	villages.	It	was	rather	a	tool	to	
rapidly	achieve	more	outcomes	in	a	short	period	of	time	by	mobilizing	people.		Inadvertently,	
the	experience	of	participation	provided	villagers	with	a	chance	to	experience	grass-roots	
democracy	 and	 to	 have	 increased	 influence,	 though	with	 some	 reservation,	 on	 the	 local	
governments.	This	increased	influence,	however,	did	not	lead	to	a	pro-democracy	movement	
against	the	regime.
Devotion and commitment of Saemaul leaders
	 Much	 research	has	 identified	 the	crucial	presence	of	an	organizational	or	political	
“entrepreneur”	 that	mobilizes	 and	 leads	 people	 in	 collective	 activities	 as	 one	 of	 the	 key	
factors	 in	 successful	 local	 development.	 The	 democratically	 selected	 young	 male	 and	
female	leaders	of	Saemaul	Undong	played	an	important	role	in	promoting	participation	and	
in	eventually	introducing	democratic	leadership	to	the	villages.	One	common	denominator	
shared	by	almost	all	of	the	success	cases	was	the	devotion	and	dedication	of	the	leaders	
in	the	villages.	Most	villagers	pointed	to	the	devoted	and	diligent	Saemaul	 leaders	as	the	
number	one	factor	of	success.		
	 It	 is	 interesting	 that,	 though	 they	were	 the	potentially	 powerful	 local	 leaders	often	
with	strong	local	support,	Saemaul	leaders	never	became	a	challenge	to	the	Government	
authority.	 Though	 it	 was	 not	 clear	 whether	 it	 had	 predicted	 a	 possible	 threat	 and	 had	
exercised	precautionary	measures,	the	Government	banned	Saemaul	leaders	from	joining	
any	 political	 party.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 people,	 who	 must	 have	 been	 fully	 aware	 of	 the	
commanding	involvement	of	the	Government	in	Saemaul	Undong,	would	not	dare	to	use	the	
very	opportunity	provided	by	the	Government	to	turn	against	it.		
IV. LIMITATIONS AND CRITICISMS
Failure in adaptation
	 In	the	late	1970s,	after	completing	most	of	 its	planned	activities,	Saemaul	Undong	
was	in	need	of	transformation	in	order	to	better	help	farmers	to	adjust	to	the	different	rural	
8  In some case they were elected by the villagers, while in others, the leader was designated according to consensus 
among villagers. In other cases, some people volunteered to be Saemaul leaders.
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environments.	 However,	 it	 failed	 to	 make	 the	 necessary	 changes	 and	 lost	 momentum.	
The	spread	of	 individualism	and	the	commercialization	of	agriculture	brought	by	Saemaul	
Undong,	 ironically,	 reduced	 the	 importance	of	communal	cooperation	and	self-reliance	 in	
rural	economic	activities	and	daily	lives.	Further	income	increases	required	more	material	
inputs	and	more	advanced	technology	rather	than	increased	cooperation.		
	 A	lack	of	a	decent	exit	strategy,	though,	could	be	easily	found	in	many	Government-
initiated	 programmes.	 Uplifted	 by	 their	 success,	 the	 Government	 often	 dragged	 and	
prolonged	the	termination	of	some	programmes	until	they	fizzled	out.	The	undefined	ending	
can	also	be	 seen	as	a	 lesson	 learned,	 but	 is	 not	 enough	 to	 completely	 deny	 it	 all	 of	 its	
achievements.
Ambiguity in scope 
	 Even	 before	 Saemaul	 Undong,	 each	 ministry	 in	 the	 Government	 had	 already	
developed	and	implemented	its	own	plans	directly	or	indirectly	related	to	rural	development,	
which	was	later	incorporated	under	the	name	of	Saemaul	Undong.	It	was	therefore	difficult	
to	 clearly	 distinguish	 pre-existing	 programmes	 from	 the	 newly	 initiated	 programmes	 for	
Saemaul	Undong,	leaving	the	possibility	of	exaggeration	of	its	achievements.	Though	it	was	
evident	that	rural	development	was	accelerated	by	Saemaul	Undong,	it	may	be	difficult	to	
isolate	the	activities	and	programmes	of	Saemaul	Undong	and	its	exact	outcome	and	impact.	
	 The	 difficulty	 of	 clear	 assessment,	 however,	 did	 not	 negate	 the	 positive	 changes	
brought	about	by	Saemaul	Undong.	The	successful	mixture	and	coordinated	activity	could	
in	some	way	suggest	that	the	scope	of	work	was	comprehensive	enough	and	the	horizontal	
coordination	among	ministries	was	adequate	and	appropriate.
Politically motivated for sustaining dictatorship
	 The	most	widely	 accepted	 criticism	of	Saemaul	Undong	 is	 that	 it	was	 not	 a	 rural	
development	 programme	 but	 rather	 a	 propaganda	 campaign	 to	 mobilize	 the	 public	 for	
President	 Park’s	 political	 gain.	 Some	 have	 claimed	 that	 President	 Park	 used	 Saemaul	
Undong	 to	 sustain	 his	 illegitimate	 Fourth	 Republic9	 and	 to	 gain	 much	 needed	 political	
support	from	his	traditional	advocates	in	rural	areas	against	growing	criticism	and	protests	in	
urban	cities.	They	also	argued	that,	to	advertise	the	changes	brought	by	Saemaul	Undong,	
development	efforts	were	often	 concentrated	on	more	 visible	 villages	 close	 to	highways,	
while	remote	communities	were	given	less	assistance.		
9  On 17 October 1972, President Park took a series of drastic measures to give himself life-long presidency. 
He declared a state of emergency, proclaimed martial law, dissolved the National Assembly and suspended the 
Constitution. He then promulgated a new Constitution called the “Yooshin (revitalizing) Constitution,” launching the 
Fourth Republic. The change ultimately concentrated all the power of the Government of the Republic of Korea to 
President Park and deeply damaged the civil liberty and democracy movements.
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	 There	seems,	however,	to	be	no	Government	policies,	including	development	policies,	
that	are	neutral	and	 free	 from	political	 influences	and	 interests.	Government	policies	and	
programmes	should	be	evaluated	on	the	extent	to	which	they	benefit	the	targeted	people.	
Top-down model under an authoritarian regime
	 Critics	also	claim	that,	since	Saemaul	Undong	was	 implemented	depending	solely	
and	heavily	 on	President	Park’s	 dictatorial	 leadership,	 it	would	not	work	 in	 a	democratic	
political	context.	It	is	quite	true	that,	without	strong	leadership	and	drive,	it	would	have	been	
very	difficult	to	mobilize	all	the	resources	in	such	a	short	period	of	time	and	make	various	
stakeholders	 cooperate	 closely.	Especially	 in	 the	 first	 phase,	 top-down	directives	and,	 in	
some	cases,	even	coercion	were	used	 to	mobilize	 resources	and	 induce	 rural	 people	 to	
participate.	It	could	be	said	that,	in	some	developing	countries	with	frequent	regime	changes,	
it	would	be	difficult	to	continuously	and	sustainably	support	such	a	policy.	It	is	not	impossible,	
however,	to	provide	sustained	support	for	a	programme	in	a	democratic	regime.	Regardless	
of	the	type	of	regime,	moreover,	it	is	not	the	case	that	all	programmes	that	receive	strong	
support	from	the	leaders	achieve	success.	Commitment	and	leadership	from	the	top	may	be	
one	of	the	prerequisites	for	a	successful	development	programme;	however,	that	alone	is	not	
a	sufficient	condition.	
Increased burden on rural people
	 The	 form	of	 contribution	 changed	 from	 labour	 donation10	 to	 cash	 contributions	 as	
the	 focus	was	 shifted	 from	 rural	 infrastructure	 development	 to	 income	generation,	which	
required	 more	 financial	 resources.	 From	 1969	 to	 1979,	 the	 average	 household	 income	
increased	some	nine	fold	from	W0.22	million	($763)	to	W2.2	million	($4,545),	while	during	
the	same	period,	the	average	household	debt	rose	13	times,	from	W13,000	to	W173,000	
(KOSIS	2008).		
	 More	than	50	per	cent	of	the	household	debt	was,	however,	taken	on	as	a	means	
of	increasing	production,	which	could	in	turn	contribute	towards	increased	productivity	and	
income	(Kim	2000).	With	more	physical	capital,	it	may	have	been	inevitable	that	there	would	
be	increased	debt	for	investment	and	this	could	be	acceptable	as	long	as	it	led	to	an	increase	
in	income.	In	1979,	the	ratio	of	debt	to	income	was	still	approximately	8	per	cent,	a	2	per	
cent	increase	from	1969	(KOSIS	2008).	It	should	be	noted	that,	in	1980,	the	debt	to	income	
ratio	drastically	increased	to	13	per	cent	and	by	an	amount	of	W340,000	per	capita	(KOSIS	
2008).	It	is	not	clear,	however,	whether	this	sudden	increase	was	due	to	the	de	facto	demise	
of	Saemaul	Undong	or	to	other	factors.
10  In many participatory rural development projects, including Saemaul Undong, villagers took part in some of the 
activities by providing their labour. They worked in construction building, for example, schools and bridges.
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Marginalization of poor people 
	 Though	rural	villages	in	the	Republic	of	Korea	were	relatively	egalitarian,	there	still	
existed	 villages	 with	 significant	 inequality	 and	 people	 living	 in	 absolute	 poverty.	 Despite	
some	measures	taken,	Saemaul	Undong	did	not	fully	incorporate	the	poorest	of	the	poor.	
In	villages	with	relatively	wide	economic	disparity,	villagers	experienced	greater	difficulty	in	
reaching	consensus	because	their	interests	tended	to	be	more	varied.	When	funds	had	to	
be	collected	or	labour	donated,	the	burden	was	typically	heavier	for	the	poorer	villagers,	who	
certainly	had	less	cash	and	were	probably	less	inclined	to	give	their	labour	away	for	free,	
especially	when	they	relied	heavily	on	wage	labour	to	earn	a	living.		It	is	worth	noting	that	the	
landless	or	nearly	landless	poor	who	formed	some	15	or	30	per	cent	of	the	rural	population	at	
that	time,	depending	on	how	poverty	was	measured,	did	not	generally	receive	any	significant	
benefit	from	Saemaul	Undong	(Brandt	1981).	They	had	little	or	no	farmland	to	cultivate	and	
the	cost	of	replacing	roofs	or	wiring	their	homes	for	electricity	was	too	heavy	a	burden	for	
them.	There	was	little	change	in	values	or	attitudes	among	people	in	this	group,	and	they	
generally	did	not	speak	favourably	of	Saemaul	Undong	(Brandt	1981).		
	 Addressing	the	poorest	of	 the	poor	proved	to	be	quite	a	challenging	task	for	most	
development	 programmes.	 Though	 the	 average	 income	 of	 rural	 households	 and	 the	
general	living	standards	had	increased,	there	were	few,	or	none,	of	the	proactive	measures	
to	 prevent	 the	 further	marginalization	 or	 incorporate	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 extremely	 poor	 in	
Saemaul	 Undong.	 Given	 the	 severe	 disparities	 and	 the	 vast	 number	 of	 people	 living	 in	
absolute	poverty	in	developing	countries	today,	careful	attention	should	be	paid	and	delicate	
strategies	should	be	formulated	before	any	replication	of	Saemaul	Undong	is	made.
Continued urban migration 
	 Despite	 some	 improvements	 in	 rural	 living	 conditions	 and	 increases	 in	 income,	
Saemaul	Undong	did	not	reverse	the	trend	of	urban	migration.	The	rural	population	continued	
to	decrease	during	and	after	Saemaul	Undong,	with	rural	villages	filled	with	the	old	and	the	
young	 (table	 7	 and	 figure	 1).	 In	 the	 early	 1960s,	 the	 average	 urban	migration	 rate	 was	
1.3	persons	per	every	100	persons,	but	in	late	1970	it	rose	to	3.7	persons	(Park	and	Ahn	
1999).	This	continuous	decrease	in	the	rural	population	indicated	that,	despite	some	positive	
changes,	Saemaul	Undong	was	not	extensive	enough	to	address	the	deep-rooted	structural	
problems	of	rural	villages,	which	rather	required	systematic	and	comprehensive	strategies	
and	drastic	changes	in	agricultural	policies.	People	constantly	suffered	from	problems	such	
as	deteriorating	terms	of	trade	for	agricultural	products,	artificial	price	distortion	of	agricultural	
products	partly	imposed	by	the	Government,	and	increasing	rural	household	debts.	
	
	 On	the	other	hand,	others	have	argued	that	Saemaul	Undong	was	never	meant	to	
replace	 industrial	 development	 or	 to	 deflect	 the	 subsequent	 urban	 migration.	 Economic	
development	 in	 the	 Republic	 of	 Korea	 was	 based	 on	 industrialization	 and	 policymakers	
never	 intended	 to	 change	 that	 course.	 The	 goal	 was	 to	 lessen	 the	 negative	 impact	 of	
industrialization	and	 the	 rural	 urban	gap.	Saemaul	Undong	was	designed	 to	prepare	 the	
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rural	 population	 to	 adapt	 to	 urban	 life	 and	 to	 minimize	 the	 impact	 of	 their	 migration	 by	
providing	rural	people	with	technical	training	in	various	fields	and	employment	opportunities	
in	Saemaul	factories	in	rural	areas.	
Table 7. Population growth rate 
(Percentage)
Period Total Urban Rural
1955-1960 2.88 5.51 1.96
1961-1965 2.71 5.96 1.29
1966-1970 1.90 7.16 -1.16
1971-1975 1.98 5.37 -0.81
1976-1980 1.84 4.89 -1.12
Source:	Sun-Woong	Kim	(1980)	“Urbanization	pattern	of	Korea	and	urban	population	increase	component”,	
Korea Development Review,	Spring,	p.151.
Figure 1. Rural population change from 1970 to 1985
Source:	Data	from	the	National	Statistics	Information	Service,	accessed	from	www.kosis.kr	on	7	March	
2008.	
V. LESSONS LEARNED FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
	 Some	have	argued	that	Saemaul	Undong,	having	been	implemented	some	30	years	
ago,	would	not	be	appropriate	in	the	new	millennium.	Others	have	pointed	out	that	the	rural	
development	model	has	evolved	with	new	findings	and	Saemaul	Undong	might	be	outdated.	
It	is	true	that	Saemaul	Undong	took	place	a	long	time	ago	but	also	true	that	we	all	learn	from	
history	and	our	past	experiences.		
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	 Though	it	was	an	old	model,	the	objectives	that	Saemaul	Undong	achieved	and	the	
principles	on	which	it	was	based	are	not	different	from	the	ones	that	the	rural	development	
programmes	of	today	aim	to	accomplish	and	on	which	they	are	founded.	Despite	limitations	
and	criticisms,	Saemaul	Undong	promoted	social	and	human	development	 in	rural	areas.	
The	improvement	in	rural	infrastructure	and	the	living	environment	reduced	the	vulnerability	
of	 people	 to	 natural	 disasters	 and	 disease	 pandemics	 and	 provided	 easier	 and	 broader	
accesses	to	and	widened	opportunities	for	markets,	better	education	and	resources.	Saemaul	
Undong	also	contributed	 to	reducing	absolute	poverty	and	 increasing	 the	 income	 level	of	
rural	people.	In	addition,	it	brought	some	favourable	changes	in	abolishing	archaic	customs	
and	empowered	women	to	become	development	agents.	The	increased	accountability	and	
capacity	of	local	government	officials	and	the	empowerment	of	villagers	can	also	be	listed	
as	desirable	changes,	though	most	of	these	were	brought	about	unintentionally.		
	 Those	 improvements	 and	 changes	 were	 possible	 as	 Saemaul	 Undong	 utilized	
the	same	policies	and	strategies	 that	most	development	agencies	emphasize	and	utilize	
today	for	their	own	rural	development	programmes.	The	International	Fund	for	Agricultural	
Development	argued	in	its	Rural Poverty Report 2001	that	the	rural	poor	need	legally	secure	
entitlements	to	assets,	especially	land	and	water,	technology,	access	to	markets,	opportunities	
to	 participate	 in	 decentralized	 resource	management	 and	 access	 to	microfinance	 (IFAD	
2001).	It	consequently	claimed	that	it	is	necessary	to	create	a	pro-poor	policy	environment	
and	to	allocate	significant	resources	to	the	poor	for	the	alleviation	of	poverty	and	economic	
growth.	The	policy	recommendation	and	assessment	on	the	needs	and	challenges	of	the	
rural	poor	in	that	report	are	not	so	different	from	the	challenges	and	strategies	explained	in	
this	paper.	 In	other	words,	 though	the	terminology	was	archaic	and	the	methodology	and	
approaches	were	not	clearly	defined	in	the	ways	that	today’s	development	programmes	are,	
what	Saemaul	Undong	achieved	and	how	it	did	so	were	not	different	from	the	goals	that	rural	
development	projects	and	programmes	aim	to	accomplish	today.
	 In	fact,	the	distinction	between	Saemaul	Undong,	as	well	as	other	successful	rural	
development	programmes,	and	unsuccessful	programmes	is	that	the	successful	programmes	
developed	 and	 implemented	 workable,	 practical	 and	 specific	 plans	 and	 strategies	 in	
accordance	with	and	making	use	of	specific	local	contexts.	Few	people	dispute	or	disagree	
with	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 key	 principles	 of	 development,	 such	 as	 building	 an	 enabling	
environment	 or	 promoting	 the	 inclusive	 participation	 of	 local	 people	 in	 the	 development	
programme.		
	 What	 is	more	 difficult	 is	 the	 substantive	 development	 of	 detailed	 plans	 and	 tools	
to	realize	those	abstract	principles	in	specific	local	contexts.	What	“enabling	environment”	
means	and	how	 it	can	be	achieved	are	 totally	different	 from	context	 to	context.	Saemaul	
Undong,	for	example,	managed	to	establish	an	enabling	institutional	environment	by	making	
use	of	its	administrative	structure.	Using	the	centralized	structure,	it	horizontally	and	vertically	
linked	relevant	ministries	while	it	connected	the	performance	of	the	government	officials	to	
the	progress	of	Saemaul	Undong,	making	use	of	meritocracy	at	that	time.	Saemaul	Undong	
also	combined	favourable	social	contexts	with	practical	and	workable	policies	and	strategies.	
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In	other	words,	it	linked	the	right	policies	with	the	right	conditions.	It	combined	a	favourable	
social	environment	with	cleverly	designed	tools	and	strategies	promoting	the	 involvement	
of	 people,	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 staying	 in	 line	 with	 Government	 policies.	 Based	 on	
strong	social	capital	and	an	egalitarian	rural	social	structure,	the	Government	promoted	the	
participation	of	villagers.		Continued	economic	growth	supported	the	programme	financially,	
while	strong	leadership	provided	political	support.		
	 The	 most	 important	 lessons	 learned	 from	 Saemaul	 Undong	 are	 that	 it	 devised	
appropriate	strategies	and	measures	reflecting	and	making	use	of	specific	political,	economic	
and	social	contexts.	Following	the	model	blindly	would	therefore	definitely	not	achieve	the	
same	 results	 in	 other	 countries.	 Developing	 countries	 should	 carefully	 study	 their	 own	
situation	and	devise	workable	and	practical	solutions	of	their	own.	The	rest	of	this	chapter	
will	draw	key	policy	suggestions	that	could	be	applied	 in	other	development	programmes	
and	further	issues	to	consider	in	current	development	contexts.
Importance of political commitment
	 Many	studies	listed	the	political	commitment	of	the	leader	or	of	the	Government	as	one	
of	the	key	success	factors	of	community	development	programmes.	In	fact,	many	successful	
community	development	programmes	started	with	the	initiative	of	top	level	politicians.	Given	
the	fact	that	community	development	programmes	require	long	periods	of	time	for	planning	
and	 implementation,	 and	 significant	 funding,	 strong	 and	 strenuous	 commitment	 from	 the	
top	is	a	prerequisite	for	budget	allocation	and	resource	mobilization.		Political	commitment	
is	also	important	in	managing	development	programmes	since	government	officials	tend	to	
put	more	effort	and	pay	more	attention	to	the	policies	and	programmes	that	the	top	leader	
considers	the	top	priority.		
	 For	10	years,	President	Park	emphasized	Saemaul	Undong	as	a	top	governmental	
priority.	The	unwavering	commitment	of	the	top	leader	enabled	the	Government	to	allocate	5	
per	cent	of	its	tax	revenue	every	year	to	the	programme	for	the	10	years.	In	this	hierarchical	
and	 centralized	Government	 system,	 the	 commitment	 from	 the	 top	 leader	 led	 high-level	
Government	officials	to	make	significant	efforts	since	their	personal	interests,	such	as	chances	
of	promotion,	depended	on	the	results	they	delivered	to	the	president.		High-level	officials	
encouraged	low-level	officials	by	linking	their	performance	evaluation	to	Saemaul	Undong	
delivery.	It	would	have	been	difficult	to	sustain	and	manage	the	nationwide	programme	for	a	
decade	without	continuous	commitment	from	the	top	leader.
Creating an enabling environment based on meritocracy and vertical integration
	 According	to	Boyer	and	Ahn	(1991),	reflecting	the	focus	on	democratization	and	good	
governance,	which	are	central	 in	the	development	agenda	of	today,	many	countries	have	
adopted	 or	 moved	 towards	 the	 decentralization	 of	 governance.	While	 centralization	 has	
disadvantages,	decentralization	is	not	a	panacea	for	ending	poverty	and	underdevelopment	
in	rural	areas	of	developing	countries.	In	many	developing	countries,	the	local	poor	depend	
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heavily	on	the	local	elites	who	dominate	resources	and	power.	Abrupt	decentralization	without	
a	 well-laid	 plan	 and	 insightful	 consideration	 of	 the	 existing	 power	 structure	may	 end	 up	
legitimately	reinforcing	the	vested	interest	of	the	local	elite.	Decentralization	and	devolution	
may	not	 always	be	better	 for	 rural	 community	 development	 programmes	 in	 the	absence	
of	 delicate	 coordination	 between	 the	 central	 and	 the	 local	 government	 and	 a	 systematic	
mechanism	to	fend	off	too	much	influence	among	local	elites	and	to	hear	the	voices	of	the	
poor.
	 To	avoid	the	local	capture	of	benefits,	the	government-selected	leaders	were	separate	
from	the	traditional	village	leaders,	who	usually	represented	vested	interests.		Competency-
based	 recruitment	 of	 government	 officials	 was	 also	 important	 to	 lessen	 the	 influence	 of	
the	 local	elites.	Local	government	officials	were	 the	people	who	passed	 the	national	civil	
service	examinations	and	were	dispatched	from	the	central	Government.		Those	measures	
effectively	reduced	the	influence	of	or	domination	by	the	local	elites	during	the	course	of	the	
Saemaul	Undong	period.	
	 Delicate	coordination	between	the	central	and	local	government	reduced	overlapping	
and	 duplication	 and	 resulted	 in	 effective	 management.	 Using	 the	 centralized	 structure,	
it	 horizontally	 and	 vertically	 linked	 relevant	 ministries	 and	 coordinated	 their	 activities	
and	plans.	While	 the	central	Government	set	 the	guidelines	and	strategies	 for	 the	whole	
programme,	 each	 level	 of	 local	 government	 planned	 and	 managed	 its	 subprogrammes	
under	 its	 jurisdiction.	 The	 lower	 levels	 of	 government	 submitted	 progress	 reports	 and	
completion	reports	to	the	higher	levels	of	government.	All	the	reports	were	later	reviewed	by	
the	central	Government.	Developing	countries	should	devise	ways	to	build	the	capacity	of	
their	governments	with	careful	consideration	of	their	own	institutional	structure.
Providing motivation and utilizing personal interests 
	 Although	 the	 selection	 of	 new	 leaders	 in	 the	 villages	 and	 the	 competency-based	
recruitment	and	advancement	system	were	helpful	for	the	programme,	this	was	not	enough	
to	ensure	the	effective	implementation	of	the	programme.	As	with	other	social	programmes,	
community	development	programmes	are	heavily	dependent	on	the	devotion	and	efforts	of	
the	people.	Saemaul	Undong	motivated	and	increased	participation	by	raising	the	confidence	
of	 the	 village	 people,	 aligning	 their	 personal	 interests	 with	 the	 projects	 and	 stimulating	
competition	among	people.
	 At	the	initial	stage,	the	village	projects	were	small	and	easy	to	manage,	addressing	
basic	needs	such	as	water	and	sanitation.	Observing	the	benefits	and	realizing	their	capacity,	
the	 villagers	 gained	 self-confidence	and	belief	 in	 the	 usefulness	 of	 the	 programme.	This	
naturally	led	to	increased	participation.
	 Second,	the	Government	linked	the	personal	interests	of	the	people	with	the	success	
of	 the	programme.	All	 the	village	projects	were	designed	to	address	the	basic	needs	that	
the	villagers	said	were	the	most	urgent	and	serious.	The	implementation	of	the	projects	was	
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therefore	in	their	own	interest,	which	reduced	possible	opposition	among	the	people	to	the	
Government	decision	requiring	the	usage	of	their	own	resources	for	implementation.	
	 Third,	the	Government	boosted	morale	and	stimulated	competition	among	villagers	
by	selective	assistance	and	information	distribution.	It	provided	more	assistance	for	villages	
with	more	outputs,	and	the	differences	in	assistance	were	publicly	announced.	Villages	with	
less	assistance	tried	to	catch	up	with	 those	receiving	more	assistance,	 increasing	overall	
performance.	The	dissemination	of	success	stories	via	nationwide	broadcasting	also	gave	
hope	and	raised	confidence	among	people	and	led	to	more	active	participation	and	higher	
outputs.
Understanding and incorporating local context
	 Numerous	research	studies	have	noted	the	importance	of	local	contexts	in	community	
development	programmes.	Saemaul	Undong	also	owed	its	success	to	the	incorporation	of	
the	social,	cultural	and	economic	contexts	of	the	Republic	of	Korea	at	that	time.	The	notions	
of	 diligence	 and	 cooperation	 promoted	 by	 Saemaul	 Undong	 were	 based	 on	 traditional	
Korean	values.	The	massive	mobilization	of	resources	and	strong	chain	of	command	from	
the	 top	 level	of	Government	 to	 the	villages	were	made	possible	due	 to	strong	 leadership	
and	 an	 authoritarian	 regime.	 Strong	 and	 continuous	 economic	 growth	 sustained	 the	
resources	required	for	rural	development	while	at	the	same	time	expanding	the	market	for	
rural	agricultural	products.	The	relatively	successful	land	reforms	also	created	a	favourable	
environment	for	community-based	rural	development.	These	are	country-	and	time-specific	
conditions	that	may	or	may	not	exist	in	other	developing	countries.	From	the	choice	of	village	
projects	to	the	capacity-building	of	 local	governments,	a	careful	analysis	and	assessment	
of	 specific	 conditions	 and	 contexts	 should	 first	 be	 conducted	 to	 ensure	 successful	 rural	
development.	Programmes	should	be	rooted	in	their	own	sociocultural	contexts	at	any	point	
in	time.
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